



THE TRANSFORMATION OF RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AFTER THE COLD WAR (1991-1993)

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ABSTRACT

The end of the Cold War affected not only international politics but also Russian domestic politics and institutions, including Russian intelligence organizations. Using a comprehensive literature survey and conducting two semi-structured interviews with experts on Russian national security on 18th May 2019, this article examines the transformation of the Russian intelligence community after the Cold War (1991-1993). I argue that the end of the Cold War, the 1991 August Coup particularly, dramatically affected Soviet/Russian intelligence organizations. I also argue that the transformation of the Russian intelligence community took place in three domains: change in the philosophy of Russian intelligence, change in Russian intelligence tradecraft and organizational change within the Russian intelligence community. First, Russian policymakers realized that KGB not only involved the August Coup that accelerated the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics but also failed to predict the end of the Cold war and it operated as an ideological guardian of the Soviet regime instead of an intelligence organization. Second and consequently, these policymakers tried to update and de-ideologize the KGB. Last, the KGB was dissolved, and five new intelligence organizations were founded after the end of the Cold war.

Keywords: KGB, Russia, Intelligence, Organizational Change, Cold War.

SOĞUK SAVAŞ SONRASI RUS İSTİHBARAT TOPLULUĞUNUN DÖNÜŞÜMÜ (1991-1993)

ÖZET

Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesi sadece uluslararası politikayı değil, Rus iç politikasını ve istihbarat örgütleri de dahil olmak üzere tüm Rus kurumlarını etkilemiştir. Kapsamlı bir literatür taraması ve iki Rusya ulusal güvenlik uzmanı ile 18 Mayıs 2019 tarihinde gerçekleştirilen yarı yapılandırılmış mülakatlar sonucunda, bu makale Soğuk Savaş sonrası (1991-1993) Rus istihbarat örgütlerinin yaşadığı dönüşümü incelemektedir. Bu bağlamda, çalışmada, 1991 Ağustos Darbesi özelinde, Soğuk Savaş'ın bitişinin Sovyet/Rus istihbarat örgütlerini ciddi boyutta etkilediği savunulmaktadır. Ayrıca, çalışma kapsamında, Rus istihbarat örgütlerinin yaşadığı dönüşümün üç alanda gerçekleştiği savunulmaktadır. Bahsi geçen alanlar; Rus istihbarat felsefesindeki değişim, Rus istihbarat metotlarındaki değişim ve kurumsal değişimdir. Bu eksenle, ilk olarak, Rus politik karar alıcılar; KGB'nin 1991 Ağustos Darbesi'ndeki rolünün Sovyetler Birliği'nin çöküşünü hızlandırdığının, KGB'nin Soğuk Savaş'ın bitişini öngöremediğinin ve ideolojik faaliyetlere odaklandığının farkına varmıştır. Bununla bağlantılı olarak ikinci aşamada, Rus karar alıcılar KGB'yi güncellemek ve ideolojiden arındırmayı denemişlerdir. Son olarak, KGB dağıtılmış ve yerine beş yeni istihbarat örgütü kurulmuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: KGB, Rusya, İstihbarat, Kurumsal Değişim, Soğuk Savaş.

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Introduction

The end of the Cold War is one of the most studied phenomena in the international relations literature. Several scholars analyzed the impact of the end of the Cold War on international relations theories literature¹, or on security studies². In addition to this theoretical literature, there is major literature that tries to explain the reasons for the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). While some scholars explained the dissolution via economic factors (Ellman 2002: 134), other scholars focused more on ideology (Mitchell vd., 2000) or arms race (Marples 2011: 462). Yet, an overarching approach to analyze the dissolution of the USSR fails to grasp the role of domestic organizations in the dissolution of the USSR and the impact on the end of the Cold war to the domestic transformation of Russia. Hence, I firmly believe that it is essential to shedding light on the domestic effects of the end of the Cold War. In that respect, I analyze the impact of the end of the Cold War on Soviet/Russian intelligence community between 1991 and 1993 in this article. It is also important to note that this analysis is formulated through a unique methodology developed by me – a three-staged-change framework that I briefly discuss key concepts of it in the following sections of this article.

I firmly believe that one event is particularly vital to understand the dissolution of the USSR since it served as a catalyzer for the dissolution, which is the 1991 Soviet coup d'état attempt, also known as the August Coup. After becoming the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev initiated two reform programs that aimed to create a more transparent and up to date political and social system in the Soviet Union that also called as glasnost and perestroika. Gorbachev's efforts to initiate and expand these two programs were harshly criticized by senior commanders and officials of the Soviet Army and the principal intelligence agency the KGB (Zhong 1992: 47; Walther 2004: 676). As a result of the divergence of the perspectives of Russian policymakers and senior bureaucrats on these reform programs, a clandestine anti-Gorbachev clique started to work on removing Gorbachev from the office. On 19th August 1991, a combination of senior Russian military commanders, senior KGB officials and some members of the Russian cabinet tried to overthrow Gorbachev government by declaring a state of emergency which is also known as the 1991 August Coup (Bonnell vd. 2015: 33-35; Walther 2004: 676). However, after a four-day struggle in Moscow, the coup attempt failed, and coup plotters were arrested. Even though the coup attempt failed, it had dramatic consequences for Soviet/Russian politics, including the resignation of Mikhail Gorbachev and the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991. In addition, the August Coup and the end of the Cold war specifically led to a transformation in the Russian intelligence community. In other words, it led to a change in the philosophy of Russian intelligence, change in Russian intelligence tradecraft and organizational change within the Russian intelligence community. This article proceeds as follows. First, I provide a brief evaluation of literature on Russian intelligence organizations and explain how this article contributes to the literature. Second, I explain and analyze the change in the philosophy of Russian intelligence after the end of the Cold War. Third and related to the second, I explain and analyze the change in Russian intelligence tradecraft. Last, I provide organizational change within the Russian intelligence system between 1991 and 1993. In other words, I analyze the transformation of the Russian intelligence community after the Cold war (1991-1993).

¹ For instance, see. (Wohlforth 1994).

² For instance, see. (Baldwin 1995) and (Enders - Sandler 1999).



An Evaluation of Literature on Russian Intelligence Community

It is safe to claim that intelligence studies, in general, lack of a growing literature for several reasons. I argue that two main obstacles affect progress in the literature, and I categorize these obstacles as perception issues and data issues. On the one hand, intelligence studies as a field is still a no-touch area for numerous scholars, particularly from the non-Western academia. On the other hand, because of the secret nature of the intelligence activities, it is hard to reach a reliable data. Therefore, these two issues combined affected the progress of intelligence studies severely. Further, it is important to acknowledge that a majority of scholarly work in intelligence studies literature is either produced by Western scholars or is related to Western intelligence organizations. Therefore, it is safe to assert that the literature on the Russian intelligence community is not only rudimentary but also mostly produced by Western researchers such as Knight, Galeotti, and Bateman.

I categorized the literature on the Russian intelligence community into four sections. These are *institution-specific literature*, *terrorism-specific literature*, and *history of Soviet/Russian intelligence literature* and *Russian intelligence in the Putin era literature*.

In the institution-specific literature on the Russian intelligence community, several studies analyze a specific Russian intelligence organization. It is important to acknowledge that most articles in this literature cover the main successor of the KGB, the FSB. For instance, Anderson (2006) explains how the FSB expanded its power and influence in the early 2000s. Likewise, Walther (2014) analyzes the FSB activities in the late 1990s. Similar to Anderson and Walther, Bateman (2016) and Marten (2017) examine the FSB with a specific focus on the organizational culture. In other words, this literature mostly focuses on a single intelligence agency in the Russian national security system and analyzes its relations with other actors in the Russian national security machinery.

In the terrorism-specific literature, the main focus is the role of Russian intelligence organizations in Russian counterterrorism efforts, particularly their activities in the Chechen wars. For instance, Herd (2000; 2002) and Kramer (2005) extensively analyze Russian intelligence activities/operations against Chechen insurgents during the first and the second Chechen War. In the history of Soviet/Russian intelligence literature, on the other hand, scholars mostly focus on KGB activities during the Soviet era. For instance, Knight (1996), Van der Oye (1999) and Hughes and Kislenko (2017) analyze the KGB operations both domestic and abroad before the end of the Cold war.

The last but the most advanced literature on the Russian intelligence community is Russian intelligence in the Putin era. In an interesting manner, this literature primarily focuses on the role of former Russian intelligence personnel (also called as *siloviki*) in Russian policymaking instead of Russian intelligence activities in the Putin era. For instance, Waller (2004a), Anderson (2006; 2007), Bateman (2014), Hughes and Kislenko (2017) and Meakins (2018) analyze the increasing influence of former Russian intelligence personnel in the Putin administration.

As can be seen in the brief evaluation of the literature on Russian intelligence community, current literature consists of the studies that a) cover a specific intelligence organization within the Russian intelligence community, b) focus on terrorism-related intelligence activities, c) historical analyses and d) former Russian intelligence personnel. Therefore, a study that analyzes the transformation of the Russian intelligence community after the Cold war and provides a general understanding of this transformation is needed.

Hence, I argue that this article is a vital contribution to the literature because it formulates a framework to explain the change in Russian intelligence community in a broader perspective.

Key Concepts and Analysis

Before analyzing the transformation of the Russian intelligence community after the Cold war, it is vital to provide the key concepts in this article. To understand and explain the types of change in intelligence organizations, I coined three concepts. These are philosophical change in intelligence, change in intelligence tradecraft and organizational change. The definitions of these three key concepts are below.

Philosophical change in intelligence: In its simplest form, a *philosophical change* refers to a change in threat perceptions or prioritization of intelligence conduct. In other words, it is a change in the intelligence community's officials and/or senior policymakers' minds regarding threats or intelligence processes.

Change in intelligence tradecraft: It refers to a change in the methods and scope of intelligence organizations.

Organizational change in intelligence: It refers to a change in the organization/structure of the intelligence community. It can be the establishment of a new department/agency in the intelligence community or abolishing a department/agency. It also can be the establishment of collaboration platforms among different intelligence agencies related to a philosophical change.

Given the definitions of key concepts in this study, I argue that the end of the Cold war, the 1991 August coup particularly, led to a transformation of the Russian intelligence community. Further, I argue that this transformation took place in three domains. The rest of the article analyzes this transformation in these three domains.

Philosophical Changes

After a comprehensive survey of the relevant literature, official reports of Soviet legislative branch and semi-structured interviews with two experts on Russian national security, I argue that there are, at least, two interrelated philosophical changes occurred regarding the Russian intelligence community after the end of the Cold war. These are realizing that *the KGB failed to predict the end of the Cold War*, the collapse of the USSR specifically and *the KGB was the ideological guardian of the regime instead of being an intelligence organization*. In other words, senior Russian policymakers realized that KGB is an inefficient and ideological organization that should be revised.

I start with the first philosophical change, namely the KGB's failure to predict the end of the Cold War. During the Soviet era, as the leading intelligence organization, the KGB was responsible for conducting intelligence activities both in the USSR and abroad (Knight 1996: 6). Hence, it can be said that most of the Soviet and then Russian political elite blamed the KGB for its inefficiency for predicting the collapse of the USSR. As Pringle (1998: 176) puts, both the KGB documents from the Soviet era and the memoirs of Soviet political elite show that the KGB failed to provide accurate and reliable intelligence that also paved the way to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Realizing the KGB's failure, as a philosophical change, led to two reactions in that regard. Some argued that the KGB itself played a role in accelerating the dissolution of the Soviet Union by involving in the August coup in 1991. As the KGB's Oleynikov Commission concluded, the KGB involved the August coup and played a vital role both in organizing

and conducting the coup attempt (Walther 2004: 677). Those who argue that the KGB's role in the August Coup quickens the dissolution of the USSR stress the political chaos afterward, the coup attempt that led to the declaration of independence of Moldova, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan on the end of the August 1991. The second group points to the inefficiency of the analysis branches of the KGB regarding the prediction of the end of the Cold War/the dissolution of the USSR. It is also important to note that the criticism is not only to the inefficiency of the KGB's analysis branches but also the KGB's culture of ignoring the analysis. As Pringle (1998: 178) presents, even though the KGB's operational branches had thousands of employees, its main analytical branch, the Directorate of Intelligence Analysis, had roughly two hundred employees that were responsible not to produce analysis but also to edit operational intelligence reports. The analysis branch also did not have any vital role in the intelligence cycle. Per the 1985 annual KGB report, only 186 of 8000 intelligence reports had analytical estimates (Pringle 1998: 179). In a nutshell, the end of the Cold War, as a philosophical change, led to the realization of the KGB's inefficiency in terms of providing accurate and reliable intelligence to Russian policymakers.

The second philosophical change is realizing the KGB's role in the Soviet regime and its inefficiency as an intelligence organization. The KGB in the Cold War era operated not as an intelligence service but as a guardian of the ideology and the regime of the USSR. The KGB, as an intelligence organization, was an instrument for protecting the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the regime (Walther 2004: 667; Anderson 2006: 238) whatever means necessary (Bateman 2016: 24). As Pringle (1998: 176) and Walther (2004: 674) put, the KGB was not only strictly controlled by the Communist Party but also its main task was to serve to the party instead of the country. Given the relationship between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the KGB, it can be reasonably argued that most of the KGB's activities were ideological service instead of contributing the Soviet/Russian national security. In the USSR soil, the KGB sought after Soviet citizens that are opponents to the regime and the party (Knight 1996: 6; Walther 2004: 666; Meakins 2018: 235). In abroad, the task was the same: eliminating the opponents of the regime (Bateman 2016: 40). Furthermore, the KGB's prioritization of the Communist Party over the Soviet Union can be clearly seen in its final operations. Per the August Coup investigation committee report³, the KGB, the First Chief Directorate specifically, not only helped to export the wealth of the Communist party's elites to the Western world but also established businesses to hide the money abroad from the authority of the Russian Federation (Pringle 1998: 176; Albini vd. 1998: 30). Russian national security experts Dr. Iskren Ivanov and Dr. Przemysław Gasztold also observe the philosophical changes in Russian policymakers after the end of the Cold war. Below, I provide their insights on the Russian intelligence community's transformation after the end of the Cold war.

According to Russian national security expert Dr. Ivanov;

"The end of the Cold War resulted in a total revisit of the old intelligence doctrines. There are three different periods of change in Russian intelligence organizations after the collapse of the USSR. The first stage took place after the end of the Cold War. The main task for the change in intelligence organizations was the isolation of the old KGBists around Mikhail Gorbachev since the new Russian political elite would afraid that this former KGB personnel may try to restore the old regime. The main

³ The report was published by the Supreme Soviet Investigation of the 1991 Coup and it covers the hearings about the Illegal Financial Activity of the CPSU on 1992 (Pringle 1998: 176).



philosophical change, therefore, was a total rejection of Soviet tools and strategies for conducting intelligence.⁴

Likewise, per Dr. Gasztold;

“The involvement of the KGB into the August Coup severely affected Yeltsin’s approach regarding intelligence organizations. He promoted the idea of having several smaller intelligence agencies instead of having a huge ideological KGB.⁵”

As relevant literature, official Soviet documents and expert opinions show, the end of the Cold War, the 1991 coup attempt specifically affected the philosophy of the Russian intelligence organizations. Because of the end of the Cold War, the Russian officials realized that the KGB was an ineffective intelligence organization that had ideological motivations and it must be replaced.

Changes in Intelligence Tradecraft

The failure of Russian/Soviet intelligence organizations regarding predicting the end of the Cold War led to philosophical changes in the Russian intelligence system. These changes were mainly aimed to right what had been wrong: ideological intelligence activities and the KGB’s inefficiency both in intelligence analysis capability and threat assessment. The main task of updating Russian intelligence tradecraft was to de-ideologize the Russian intelligence agencies and countering threats in the relatively new areas for Russian security, such as financial intelligence and countering terrorism. In other words, Russian intelligence organizations reallocated their assets and resources to maximize the fight against newer threats/challenges. Instead of pursuing regime opponents in Russia and abroad, the main task of the Russian intelligence organizations became countering organized crime, terrorism, illicit financial activities and conducting industrial and technological espionage (Albini vd. 1998: 45-46). For instance, the new external intelligence agency of Russia, the SVR, was authorized to expand trade relations of Russia with other countries in (Staar vd. 2004: 49) while its predecessor the KGB’s First Chief Directorate was mainly focused on tracking and eliminating the opponents of Soviet regime abroad. In other words, after deciding that the Russian intelligence tradecraft has to change related to newer threats such as counterterrorism and financial intelligence and KGB was a huge and ideological organization in the Russian national security system, Russian policymakers dissolved the KGB into several smaller agencies to maximize its resources and assets based on the changes in intelligence tradecraft. In doing so, they not only organized the Russian intelligence system according to changes in intelligence tradecraft but also aimed to divide KGB to smaller agencies to reduce its ideological activities.

Organizational Changes

In addition to philosophical changes and change in Russian intelligence tradecraft, several organizational changes also occurred within the Russian intelligence community after the Cold War. These organizational changes are mostly related to the abolishment of Soviet-era intelligence organizations and the establishment of new intelligence agencies. All these organizational changes can be classified as *replacing the KGB to several*

⁴ Interview with Dr. Iskren Ivanov (18/05/19). Dr. Iskren Ivanov is a lecturer in Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski.” He is an expert on Russian national security and hybrid warfare.

⁵ Interview with Dr. Przemysław Gasztold (18/05/19). Dr. Przemysław Gasztold is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Terrorism Studies at the University of Warsaw. He is an expert on intelligence studies and Russian national security.

intelligence organizations. It is important to note that Russian intelligence organizations underwent several organizational changes between 1991 and 2015. However, only organizational changes related to the end of the Cold war that occurred between 1991 and 1993 are provided in this article.

The main organizational change of the Russian intelligence organization after the Cold War occurred in two stages. The first stage took only two months, from October 1991 to December 1991. The second stage, however, took longer and included relatively major changes comparing the previous stage. The first stage of the organizational change was dividing the KGB and the second stage was the dissolution of the KGB and the establishment of the new intelligence agencies.

The first stage of organizational change started right after the August Coup. In October 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev issued a decree abolishing the KGB and replacing it with three intelligence organizations, namely, an Interrepublican Security Service, a Central Intelligence Service and Border Protection Committee (Knight 1996: 31). In light of this decree, the KGB personnel was sent under the authority of these three separate intelligence organizations (Knight 1996: 31). After the ratification of the dissolution of the KGB by the USSR Supreme Soviet at the beginning of the December 1991, Boris Yeltsin issued another decree on 19th December 1991 to reorganize the Russian intelligence organizations that was also the start of the second stage of organizational change in Russian intelligence organizations after the end of the Cold war. In other words, the KGB was dismantled and was divided into various entities in the first stage of the organizational change (Albini vd. 1998: 26; Anderson 2007: 259; Bateman 2016: 23; Meakins 2018: 237).

The major and more comprehensive organizational changes and the reorganization of the KGB's personnel and responsibilities took place in the second stage of the organizational change. In this stage, the KGB, its personnel and responsibilities, divided among new five intelligence organizations namely, the SVR (*Sluzhba vneshnei razvedki*), the Ministry of Security (*Ministerstvo Bezopasnosti*), the FAPSI (*Federal'noe agentstvo pravitel'- stvennoi svyazi i informatsii*), the GUO (*Glavnoe upravlenie okhrany*) and the Federal Border Protection Service. The rest of this section provides brief information about new intelligence agencies and their difference from the KGB.

The first new Russian intelligence agency is the SVR. It was established by a decree effective 20 December 1991 as the main external intelligence organization of the Russian Federation that is responsible for espionage activity and analysis abroad (Waller 1994a: 131; Waller 1997: 5). Per the decree that established the SVR, all the property and documents of the KGB's First Chief Directorate were passed to the SVR (Waller 1994a: 131). In other words, after the dissolution of the KGB, the SVR was formed mostly by the KGB's foreign intelligence apparatus. However, the changes in the Russian intelligence tradecraft affected the new Russian external intelligence service. On the contrary to the KGB's First Chief Directorate, the SVR was structured to reflect Russia's new security priorities and was not responsible for an ideological service to the Communist Party (Waller 1994b: 6). Even though the SVR had different responsibilities than the KGB's FCD, it also had a disadvantage. While the KGB's external intelligence directorate enjoyed the huge budget and allies as a result of the Soviet system, the SVR had a relatively modest budget and operational advantages (Albini vd. 1998: 44).



The second new Russian intelligence agency is the Ministry of Security (MB)⁶. It was established in April 1992. It was also the largest intelligence organization among the new Russian intelligence agencies. As a counterintelligence agency, it inherited the properties, documents, and responsibilities of the KGB's Second Chief Directorate, the Third Chief Directorate, the Fourth Chief Directorate, the Sixth Chief Directorate, the Seventh Chief Directorate and the Directorate for Protecting the Constitution (Knight 1996: 34). Having a large portion of the KGB's structure, the MB was established to be responsible for counterintelligence activities both in domestic and abroad. Regarding the changes in intelligence tradecraft after the end of the Cold War, financial counterintelligence became one of the major tasks in counterintelligence activities of the MB instead of ideological-focused counterintelligence activities such as pursuing regime opponents as in the KGB era.

The third new Russian intelligence agency is the FAPSI. It was created on 28 December 1991 as the Soviet Government Communications Committee and was officially established by a presidential decree on 19 February 1993 as a Russian intelligence organization (Waller 1994: 123; Anderson 2007: 261). It was established as the major intelligence organization which is responsible for signal intelligence, technical intelligence, cryptography and communication safety. Properties, documents and responsibilities of the KGB's signal intelligence and communication units, the Eight Directorate (cryptography and communication security) and the Sixteenth Directorate (technical intelligence), were merged under the authority of the FAPSI (Waller 1994a: 148-149; Waller 1994b: 5; Knight 1996: 36; Waller 1997: 5). The organization was created not only to fulfill signal and technical intelligence requirements of the Russian Federation but also to oversee the government communications and encryption and conducting operational activities related to special communications both in domestic and abroad (Waller 1994a: 123; Pike, 1997; Anderson 2007: 261). Regarding the changes in intelligence tradecraft after the end of the Cold War, monitoring financial activities and providing financial security for Russian elites became one of the major tasks of the FAPSI instead of providing electronic intelligence support to the USSR's allies and monitoring Russian opponents as in the KGB era (Pike, 1997).

The fourth new Russian intelligence agency is the GUO⁷. It was officially established at the beginning of 1992. After the 1991 coup attempt, the KGB's Ninth Directorate was separated from the KGB. It was renamed as the USSR Protection Service before the end of the official dissolution of the USSR. After the dissolution, the GUO was established as a Russian intelligence organization for the protection of government leaders and critical government infrastructure (Knight 1996: 36). However, its responsibilities and power in the Russian national security apparatus expanded dramatically right after its foundation. In addition to the KGB's Ninth Directorate, the Russian Presidential Regiment (former KGB Kremlin Guards) and the KGB's special operations unit (the Alfa anti-terrorism unit) from the Seventh Directorate were transferred under the authority of the GUO (Waller 1994a: 126; Waller 1994b: 4). With that expansion, the GUO started to have its intelligence, counterintelligence, and operational units. Regarding the changes in intelligence tradecraft after the end of the Cold War, the responsibilities of the GUO is relatively fewer than its KGB counterpart. While the KGB's Ninth Directorate was responsible for the protection of

⁶ The MB was disbanded in December 1993 and replaced by the FSK - *Federal'naya Sluzhba Kontr-razvedky*. On 12 April 1995, the FSK replaced by the FSB - *Federal'naya sluzhba bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii*. (Globalsecurity, org, 2018).


⁷ The GUO was reorganized as the FSO (Federal Protection Service) on 1996.



the Politburo members and high-level Soviet officials, the GUO was responsible only for key Russian political actors such as the President and the speaker of the Russian Parliament. Also, while the KGB's Ninth Directorate was responsible for government communications, the GUO did not have such responsibility.

The last Russian intelligence agency that founded after the end of the Cold War is the Border Guard Service, the Committee for the Protection of the Russian Border. It inherited the KGB Border Troops Chief Directorate (Waller 1994a: 128). After the abolishment of the KGB's Border Troops Directorate in December 1991, the personnel and assets of the directorate subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Security. Later in 1993, the Border Guard Service was established as a separate intelligence agency (FSB.ru). This organization was established to guard Russian borders, coastal waters and the continental shelf (Waller 1994a: 128; Waller 1994b: 5). Regarding the change in intelligence tradecraft, the budget and personnel of the Border Guard Service reduced dramatically, comparing the KGB's Border Troops Directorate (Waller 1994a: 128).

As can be seen above, the KGB was dissolved into five new and relatively smaller agencies after the Cold war. In doing so, Russian policymakers, as a result of the change in the philosophy of Russian intelligence and tradecraft, transformed the Russian intelligence community. On the one hand, the KGB was dissolved to reduce its power in Russian politics; therefore, its ideological standpoint. On the other hand, it was dissolved into smaller but more sophisticated and issue-focused agencies to increase the efficiency of Russian intelligence machinery. This organizational change, from the KGB to new intelligence agencies, is provided in Figure 1 below.






Figure: 1 Russian Organizational Change after the end of the Cold War

Conclusion

I argue that the end of the Cold War, the 1991 August Coup particularly, dramatically affected Soviet/Russian intelligence organizations and the transformation of Russian intelligence community took place in three domains: change in the philosophy of Russian intelligence, change in Russian intelligence tradecraft and organizational change within the Russian intelligence community.

First, the involvement of the KGB's senior personnel into the August coup led to Russian policymakers realize that KGB is an inefficient and ideological-driven intelligence organization that plays a vital role in Soviet/Russian politics and its inefficiency and ideologic standpoint should be diminished.

Second, the KGB's intelligence conduct was highly questioned and Russian policymakers tried to update and de-ideologize it to increase its efficiency with newer threats such as terrorism and financial intelligence. Therefore, Russian intelligence tradecraft swiftly changed from ideological intelligence conduct to other issues.

Third, to diminish the KGB's ideological standpoint and to increase Russian intelligence efficiency, Russian policymakers dissolved the KGB into five newer, smaller and issue-focused intelligence agencies, namely the SVR, the MB, the FAPSI, the GUO, and the Border Guard Service.

Given the reason and process of the transformation of the Russian intelligence community after the Cold war, even though the effectiveness of this transformation is not necessarily in the scope of this article, I believe that it is also important to question the efficiency of this transformation. I argue that this transformation did not achieve an increase in the efficiency of the Russian intelligence community because of the lack of intelligence oversight in Russia in the early 1990s. Even though the Supreme Soviet Investigation Commission of the 1991 Coup, also known as the Ponomarev Commission and was established in late 1991, addressed the philosophical changes that occurred in Russian intelligence community after the August Coup and therefore the end of the Cold War and concluded that it should be dissolved (Waller, 1996), the actual dissolution of the KGB happened independently from the Commission's investigations. In other words, even a symbolic commission could not play a role in shaping the Russian intelligence apparatus. Rather, the dissolution of the KGB and the establishment of the new intelligence agencies took place via presidential decrees.

Other political actors, such as commission members, also did not play a vital role in the transformation of the Russian intelligence organizations after the end of the Cold war. For instance, while the Commission started to investigate the role of intelligence organizations in the coup attempt and at the end of the Cold War in late 1991 and 1992, the KGB dissolved and the SVR and the FAPSI were founded in 1991. Likewise, the MB and the GUO were founded at the beginning of 1992. In other words, the Russian intelligence community experienced a quick transformation that took only a couple of months after the

end of the Cold War. It is also important to note that the Commission's role in this organizational change was merely symbolic.

Because intelligence oversight of this transformation is inefficient and participation of political actors is symbolic, this transformation did not result a stable intelligence community. Therefore, Russian intelligence organizations were restructured several times after 1993. For instance, the MB was disbanded in December 1993 and replaced by the FSK - *Federal'naya Sluzhba Kontr-razvedky*. On 12 April 1995, the FSK replaced by the FSB - *Federal'naya sluzhba bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii*. Also, the GUO was reorganized as the FSO (Federal Protection Service) in 1996 (Globalsecurity, org, 2018a).

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